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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this appeal properly lies with the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
This appeal presents four broad areas of inquiry and numerous underlying issues.
The first area of inquiry is whether the various deeds in question are effective to create the
easement claimed by Appellees, William S. and Irene C. Loves (hereinafter the "Loves").
The second is, even assuming that the deeds in question were effective, whether Appellant,
Arnold Industries, Inc. (hereinafter "Arnold"), is bound by the Loves' claim. The third is
whether Arnold has a viable claim against the Salt Lake County Recorder (hereinafter the
"County" or the "Recorder"). The fourth is whether the trial court erred in denying
Arnold's motion to strike or, in the alternative, to compel discovery. The specific issues are:
1. Does Utah's After-Acquired Title Statute (Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-10) apply to
easements when that statute, in its express language, applies only to estates and not to
servitudes such as easements? This issue is reviewed for correctness, Durham v. Duchesne
County, 893 P.2d 581 (Utah 1995), and was preserved for appeal at R.550, 672.
2. Whether Utah recognizes the equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed, and if so,
what are the true origins and nature of the doctrine? This is a question of law which is
reviewed for correctness, Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1995), and was preserved
at R.551,674.
3. Does the equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed operate "automatically" to pass
after-acquired title "by operation of law," or does it operate in equity by way of an estoppel?
The interpretation and the correct application of a legal doctrine are questions of law which
are reviewed under a correctness standard, Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212
(Utah 1992), and was preserved at R.551, 676.

4. Whether, in applying the equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed, a court must find
"reasonable reliance" as required in other instances of estoppel? The interpretation and the
correct application of a legal doctrine are questions of law which are reviewed under a
correctness standard, Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992), and was
preserved at R,551, 676.
5. Whether Utah recognizes the equitable doctrine of counter estoppel? The Court's
recognition of a certain claim or cause of action is a question of law. See Jackson v.
Righter, 891 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1995). This issue was preserved at R.555, 679.
6. Whether, under this Court's interpretation of Utah's Uniform Partnership Act
(Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-1 et seq.) with regard to ownership of real property, a partnership
as an entity owns its real property and the partners do not? This is a question of law which
is reviewed for correctness. Durham v. Duchesne County, 893 P.2d 581 (Utah 1995). This
issue was preserved at R.548, 550, 972-77.
7. Whether the Loves are bound by the public record, which indicates that the
Arnold property was owned by the individuals and that the Corrective Warranty Deed was
executed by the partnership? The trial court's application of legal principles to factual
findings is reviewed for correctness. State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
The issue was preserved at R.554, 678-79.
8. Whether a corrective (confirmation) deed can "create" an easement when the deed
lacks words of conveyance and when the original deedfromwhich it arises is void for want
of a grantor? Interpretation of an unambiguous deed is a question of law, which is reviewed

on appeal for correctness. Johnson v. Higlev, 989 P.2d 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). This issue
was preserved at R.548, 550, 978-80.
9. Whether the failure to abstract a document to the tract index as required by Utah
Code Annotated section 17-21 -6(6) (1998) compels a determination that a subsequent
purchaser was not on notice of the document pursuant to Utah's race-notice recording
statute, Utah Code Annotated section 57-3-2 (1994)? Conflicts between statutes require a
legal determination, which is reviewed for correctness. Div. of Unclaimed Prop, v. McKay
Dee Credit Union, 958 P.2d 234 (Utah 1998). The issue was preserved at R.548-49, 980-82.
10. Is the abstract of the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed sufficient to impart notice
of Loves' claim of easement when it states, "ALSO POSTED SEC 22 IS 1W SEE
DOCUMENT FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION," but does not describe the Arnold
property? The trial court's application of legal principles to factual findings is reviewed for
correctness. State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The issue was preserved
atR.980-82.
11. Can the Quiet Title Decree which pertains solely to setback requirements of the
restrictive covenants establish the easement? A trial court's interpretation of an
unambiguous decree is reviewed for correctness. Southwick v. Leone, 860 P.2d 973 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993). The issue was preserved at R..983.
12. Did the trial court err in denying Arnold's motion to strike after Third Party
Defendants refused to respond to discovery requests? A trial court's ruling on a motion to
strike is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Rivera ex rel. Rivera v. State Farm

Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 1 P.3d 539 (Utah 2000) (citing Dovev.Cude, 710 P.2d 170,171 (Utah
1985)). The issue was preserved at R. 1279-84, 1360-66.
13. Was Arnold's notice of claim to Salt Lake County timely? The issue of when a
claimant discovered, or should have discovered, the facts forming the basis of a cause of
action is a question of fact and is reviewed on a "clearly erroneous" standard. Sevy v. Sec.
Title Co. of S.Utah, 902 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995). Whether the discovery rule applies to toll
the statute of limitations is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Horn v. Utah Dep't
of Pub. Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The issue was preserved at R. 1069-1103.
STATUTES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL
The text of the following provisions is set forth at Addendum Exhibit 4.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-3 (1998)

(Recorder's Statute - 1998)

Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-3 (1999)

(Recorder's Statute - 1999)

Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-6(6) (1998)

(Recorder's Statute - duties)

Utah Code Ann. §48-1-1(1998)

(Utah Uniform Partnership Act)

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-10 (1994)

(Utah's After Acquired Title Statute)

Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2 (1994)

(Race Notice Statute -1994)

Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102 (1998)

(Race Notice Statute - 1998)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was commenced to quiet title to property owned by Arnold as against the
claim of an easement by Loves. R.l-9. The property owned by Arnold (hereinafter
sometimes the "Arnold property") and the property owned by the Loves (hereinafter
sometimes the "Love property") are immediately adjacent to one another. The Arnold

property is west of the Love property. R.525. Arnold's property is located entirely in
Section 21, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. Loves'
property is located in both Sections 21 and 22. Add. Ex. 1, item 2; R.527.
Loves' assertion of an easement is founded upon three deeds executed between 1982
and 1991. Two of these deeds are in the chain of title to the Loves' property and purport to
grant an easement over the Arnold property in conjunction with a sale of the Loves'
property. The third deed, in the Arnold chain of title, is the basis for the Loves' claim of
estoppel by deed. A fourth and separate deed, also in the Arnold chain of title, forms the
basis for Arnold's defense of counter estoppel. All of these deeds were recorded in the
official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office.
The complaint was filed on October 4, 1996. R.l. Arnold sought a determination
that the deeds were not legally effective to create the easement claimed by the Loves. R.19. On August 21, 1998, the complaint was amended to name the County as a defendant.
R.780. Arnold sought damages against the County due to the Recorder's failure to properly
abstract a 1991 corrective warranty deed to the tract index for the Arnold property. R.78991.
The issues concerning the legal effectiveness of Loves' claim of an easement were
presented to the trial court by way of cross motions for summary judgment. R.357-77, 53163, 587-611, 661-84. Oral arguments on the motions were heard on March 1, 1999. Ruling
from the bench, the trial court denied Arnold's motion and granted Loves' motion for
summary judgment. R.934, 1433 (pp. 70-71). A proposed order was submitted by Loves
pursuant to the court's ruling. R.991. Arnold filed an objection to the proposed order.

R.970. The order was entered over Arnold's objection, and thereafter Loves filed a
supplemental affidavit. R.1001. Based upon the sworn testimony in the affidavit, Arnold
requested discovery that was refused. R1040. Arnold then moved to strike the
supplemental affidavit. R.1275.
Prior to the ruling on the cross-motions for summary judgment, Salt Lake County
had filed a motion to dismiss in response to Arnold's amended complaint. R.935. Oral
arguments on this motion were heard on June 30, 2000. The court entered an order granting
the County's motion to dismiss on July 25, 2000. R.1312.
On November 21, 2000, the court denied a motion by Arnold to strike the
supplemental affidavit filed by the Loves. R.1368. Ultimately, afinaljudgment
implementing the ruling on the cross-motions for summary judgment was entered on
January 30, 2001. R.1398. A notice of appeal was filed on February 27, 2001. R.1415.
Statement Of Facts
Introduction.

The facts involved in this appeal arise from events and recorded

deeds that span almost a quarter of a century. The earliest pertinent deed was recorded in
1975. The last relevant out-of-court event occurred in August of 1997. A statement of the
essential facts follows. A more detailed treatment of the facts is included within the
arguments, which are organized chronologically. Also, Addendum, Exhibit 7 is a diagram
of the chains of title to both properties, identifying the deeds and conveyances in question.
R.987. On Exhibit 7, the deeds are referenced by capital letters in quotes and will be so
referenced herein. Copies of the deeds themselves are similarly designated in the
Addendum, Exhibit. 2, "A"-"W".

For most of the twenty-two years pertinent to this case, title to both properties was
held in the names of certain individuals and entities. With minor exception, the individuals
and the principals of the entities, were always some combination of four individuals:
Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minson, Robert S. Halander, and H. Fred Smith (hereinafter
sometimes "the individuals" or "Smith, Halander, Smith, and Minson individually"). Add.
Ex. 7, R.987. Originally, both the Love property and the Arnold property were owned by
the same entity, Plan-Tech Corp., a Utah corporation. H. Fred Smith was the president and
Robert S. Halander was the secretary of Plan-Tech Corp. Plan-Tech Corp. divided the
properties into the Arnold and Love properties in 1975. R.270. After the properties were
divided, the chain of title to the Arnold property became complex, with approximately a
dozen conveyances between 1975 and 1991. Add. Ex. 7, R.987. The chain of title to the
Loves' property is less involved, with only four conveyances during the same time period.
Id.
The 1982 Warranty Deed.

The first unsuccessful effort to create an easement over

the Arnold property occurred in a 1982 warranty deed ("D") in the chain of title to the
Loves' property. R.275. This deed (hereinafter the "Warranty Deed" or the "1982 Warranty
Deed" ) was apparently intended to create an easement over the Arnold property as part of a
sale of the Love property from a Utah partnership known as Western Management to Loves'
immediate predecessor-in-title, William S. Lowenberg (hereinafter "Lowenberg"). The
partners of Western Management were Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minson, Robert S.
Halander, and H. Fred Smith. At the time of the 1982 Warranty Deed, Western
Management owned no interest in the Arnold property. This is the case for three reasons: 1)

Western Management had received no easement from its grantor, Minson-Halander ("B"
and "C"; R.271, 273) because Minson-Halander received no easement from its grantor,
Plan-Tech Corp. ( "A"; R.270); 2) Western Management had previously quitclaimed any
interest in the Arnold property ("L"; R.299); and 3) the legal description of the purported
grant of easement failed to describe any part of the Arnold property. "D"; R.275.
Estoppel by Deed and Counter Estoppel.

Subsequently, Western Management

came into ownership of the Arnold property in October of 1982. "N"; R.301. This deed is
the basis for one of Loves' theories, estoppel by deed. However, two years later in 1984,
Western Management conveyed the Arnold property to Arnold's predecessor-in-title. "O";
R.302. In this deed, Western Management warranted that no easement existed across the
Arnold property. This deed is the basis for Arnold's theory of counter estoppel.
Conveyance of the Arnold Property to the Individuals.

Two critical conveyances in

the Arnold chain of title occurred three years later in the winter and spring of 1987. In
February of 1987, Smith, Halander, Smith and Associates, a Utah general partnership,
executed a quitclaim deed as to its undivided one-half interest in the Arnold property. "R";
R.309. In April 1987, Walker, McElliot, Wilkinson and Associates, a Missouri general
partnership, executed a special warranty deed as to its one-half interest in the Arnold
property. "S"; R.311. The grantees in both of these deeds were Smith, Halander, Smith and
Minson, individually. As a consequence, these individuals held record title to the Arnold
Property at a critical time for this appeal, January 22,1991. Exhibit 7; R.987.
The 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed.

On January 22, 1991, a corrective warranty

deed ("E") (hereinafter the "1991 Corrective Warranty Deed" or the "Corrective Warranty

Deed") was executed. R.277. As noted, at that time record title to the Arnold property was
in the names of: H. Fred Smith, Robert S. Halander, Ronald W. Smith, and Dale N. Minson,
individually. "R" and "S"; R.309, 311. Central to this appeal, these same four individuals
executed the Corrective Warranty Deed on behalf of Western Management as "General
Partner." "E"; R.277. Hence, these persons, in their capacities as "General Partner[s]" of
Western Management, purported to create an easement over the Arnold property, in which
record title was held in their individual names.
Abstracting Errors.

The next significant events concern the Salt Lake County

Recorder's failure to properly abstract the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. It is undisputed
that the legal description in the Corrective Warranty Deed described the Arnold property.
"E"; R.277. However, critically, it is also undisputed that the legal description of this
purported grant of easement was not abstracted by the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office
to the tract index for the Arnold property as required by Utah Code Annotated section 1721-6(6) (1998). R.637. Also critically, the Recorder listed William J. Lowenberg as both
grantor and grantee in the grantors' and grantees' indices. Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-21-6(2),
(3) (1998); R.637, 639, 644. Yet, Lowenberg never owned an interest in the Arnold
property. Ex. 7; R.275, 987.
The Quiet Title Decree.

In February 1991, a "Declaratory/Quiet Title Decree" was

recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder. R.629. This Decree, which was
abstracted to the Arnold property, pertained solely to set back requirements in the
conditions, covenants, and restrictions that governed the Love property. The operative

(decretal) language of the Decree is silent as to, and does not establish the existence of, any
easement or right-of-way encumbering the Arnold property. R.629.
Status of Record Title as of the Date of Arnold's Purchase.

Accordingly, in 1993,

the condition of record title, deeds, and the official indices in the Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office was as follows: The 1982 Warranty Deed had failed to create the
easement over the Arnold property. "D"; R.396, 525. In October 1982, Western
Management, the grantor of the 1982 Warranty Deed, came into ownership of the Arnold
property. "N"; R.301. In May 1984, Western Management conveyed the Arnold property to
Arnold's predecessor-in-title and warranted title to be free of encumbrances. "O"; R.302.
The 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed described the Arnold property but was not abstracted
to the tract index for the Arnold property. "E"; R.277. Nor was the Corrective Warranty
Deed indexed to the grantees' or the grantors' indices so as to give notice that the Corrective
Warranty Deed purported to affect the Arnold property. R.637. This is because Lowenberg
was indexed as both grantee and grantor. R.637, 644. Finally, although the 1991 Quiet
Title Decree was abstracted to the Arnold property, R.638, that Decree pertained only to set
back requirements and had no bearing upon whether an easement was created in the prior
deeds. R.629-31.
Purchase of the Arnold Property.

Arnold purchased the property from Conmart,

Inc., a Utah corporation, and Dale N. Minson, individually, on July 15,1993. R.315, 1072.
H. Fred Smith was the president of Conmart, Inc. "U"; R.315. Prior to purchasing the
Arnold property, Arnold commissioned a search of the title records of the Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office. R.1073. Due to the County's failure to properly abstract the Corrective

Warranty Deed, not only was the deed not discovered in Arnold's title search, but due to its
very nature, the County's omission was also unknown to Arnold. R.1073.
Love's Claim of Easement and Notice to the County.

In April 1996,

approximately three years after Arnold purchased the property and approximately five years
after the County failed to properly abstract the Corrective Warranty Deed, Loves made their
first claim to an easement over the Arnold property. R.1073. From April 1996 until July
1997, settlement negotiations took place between Loves' counsel and Arnold's counsel.
R.1073, 1199-1246. Ultimately, the settlement negotiations broke down, and litigation
commenced in earnest in July 1997. R.1077. At this time, a detailed examination of the
unofficial computerized records of the Recorder revealed, for the first time, that the County
had failed to properly abstract the Corrective Warranty Deed to the tract index for the
Arnold property, as well as to the grantees' and grantors' indices. R.1077. In August 1997,
Arnold gave notice of its claim against Salt Lake County. R. 1079-80.
Arnold's Motion to Strike.

After the court ruled on the cross motions for summary

judgment on March 1, 1999, R.934, 1433 (pp. 70-71), Arnold filed an objection to the
ruling. R.970. In addition to stating the legal grounds as to why the court's ruling was in
error, Arnold also noted that the ruling was based entirely upon deeds of record and that
Loves had offered no evidence or affidavit to prove that, at the time of the 1991 Corrective
Warranty Deed, the Arnold property was anything other than m^f^dUxf property. R.976.
The trial court entered an order prepared by Loves' counsel without comment as to Arnold's
objection. R.991.

After the order was entered, Loves submitted the Supplemental Affidavit of Ronald
W. Smith. R.1001. In the affidavit, Mr. Smith, for the first time, testified that even though
the Arnold property was held in the names of the individuals, it was really partnership
property. R. 1002-1003. Appellant then served discovery upon Ronald W. Smith and the
other Third Party Defendants, seeking tax records which would evidence whether the Third
Party Defendants had treated the Arnold property as partnership property for tax purposes.
R.1038, 1296-1311. Mr. Smith and the other Third Party Defendants refused to provide any
meaningful information. R. 1296-1311. What little information was provided supported a
conclusion that the Arnold property had been treated as individual property. R. 1371-72 ^fl[
6, 8. Appellant then filed a motion to strike the affidavit or, in the alternative, to compel the
requested discovery. R.1275. The court denied this motion on November 21, 2000.
R.1368. The court denied a motion to reconsider on January 5, 2001. R.1389. The final
judgment in this action was then entered on January 30, 2001. R.1398.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Arnold asserts that Loves have no easement under either Utah's After-Acquired Title
Statute or the doctrine of estoppel by deed. The 1982 Warranty Deed and the 1991
Corrective Warranty Deed failed to create an easement due to defects in those deeds. In
addition, both are void for want of grantors. Loves' claim of estoppel is not supported by
reasonable reliance and is barred by a counter estoppel. Moreover, Arnold is entitled to rely
on, and the Loves are bound by, the public record. Constructive notice is imparted when a
document is properly recorded. This is the case under the applicable statutes and recent
amendments to the recorder's and race-notice recording statutes. The Recorder failed to

properly index and abstract the Corrective Warranty Deed. Finally, the trial court erred in
dismissing Arnold's claim against the County. For purposes of the Governmental Immunity
Statute, Arnold gave timely notice to the County under the facts of this case.
ARGUMENT
The beginning point in this matter is the 1982 Warranty Deed. "D"; R.275. It is
uncontested as a matter of law that no easement was established when Western Management
attempted to create an easement through this deed. R.368 Tf 8, 372-75, 605, 1433 (pp. 1415). This was because: 1) Western Management could not have received an easement from
its grantor, Minson-Halander, in 1979 ("B" and "C") because Minson-Halander had not
received an easement from its grantor ("A"); 2) Western Management had previously
quitclaimed any interest it might have had in the Arnold property in 1981 ("L"); and 3) the
legal description in the 1982 Warranty Deed failed to describe any part of the Arnold
property. The first item in Exhibit 1 (R.525) is a diagram of the legal description of the
easement described in this deed. The Arnold property is identified in yellow. The
description of the purported easement is in green. As can be seen from the exhibit, the
description fails to include any portion of the Arnold property. Accordingly, the Warranty
Deed failed to create the easement in question. R.372.
I.

UTAH'S AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY TO
SERVITUDES AND THEREFORE COULD NOT CREATE AN EASEMENT
OVER THE ARNOLD PROPERTY.
After Western Management inaccurately represented to Lowenberg in the 1982

Warranty Deed ("D"; R.275) that an easement in favor of Lowenberg existed across the

Arnold property, Western Management came into title of the Arnold property. This
occurred later in October 1982. "N"; R.301.
In granting summary judgment to Loves, the trial court ruled that Loves received an
easement by virtue of either Utah's After-Acquired Title Statute or the doctrine of estoppel
by deed. R.994. However, Utah's After-Acquired Title Statute (hereafter, "the Statute")
only applies to purported conveyances of estates, and particularly, conveyances in "fee
simple absolute." The terms of the Statute are clear and unambiguous:
If any person shall hereafter convey any real estate by conveyance purporting
to convey the same in fee simple absolute, and shall not at the time of such
conveyance have the legal estate in such real estate, but shall afterwards
acquire the same, the legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately
pass to the grantee, his heirs, successors or assigns, and such conveyance shall
be as valid as if such legal estate had been in the grantor at the time of the
conveyance.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-10 (1994) (emphasis added) (full text, Add. Ex. 4). It is hornbook
law that an easement is an encumbrance or servitude, not an estate: "An easement is neither
an estate in land nor the land itself. It is, however, property or an interest in land." 25 Am.
Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses §2 (1996).
While it is always distinct from the occupation and enjoyment of the land
itself, and is not an estate in land, or confer title to the land, or constitute a lien
thereon, an easement is property, and partakes of the nature of land.
28A C.J.S. Easements §5 (1996). Utah recognizes this axiom. Hayes v. Gibbs, 169 P.2d
781 (Utah 1946) ("[A]n easement is not a lien, it is rather a servitude imposed upon the land
sometimes said to be 'carved out' of the servient estate.").
Case law from other jurisdictions supports the view that the Statute only applies to
estates. In Noronha v. Stewart, 245 Cal. Rptr. 94 (Ct. App. 1988), the California appellate

court reviewed that state's after-acquired title statute (which is essentially similar to Utah's)
to determine whether it applied to the claim of an easement for an encroaching wall. The
court concluded that the after-acquired title statute was not applicable, stating: "This
statutory rule is limited to grants of fee simple and is therefore not applicable to the case at
hand." Id. at 96 (full text, Add. Ex. 3). The Noronha court continued in its analysis,
indicating that while the doctrine of after-acquired title would not apply to an easement, the
doctrine of estoppel by deed could be applied in that case. Id
"[W]here the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond
the language's plain meaning to divine legislative intent." Horton v. Royal Order of the
Sun, 821 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Utah 1991). Because the clear and unambiguous language of the
statute does not contemplate interests other than estates in land, it does not apply to
servitudes such as easements. Thus, if Loves could claim an easement, it could only arise
under the doctrine of estoppel by deed. However, as shown below, that doctrine does not
avail Loves' claim.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY WHETHER THE EQUITABLE
DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL BY DEED APPLIES TO EASEMENTS.
Because the After-Acquired Title Statute is limited to estates, the Court must address

whether an easement was created under the doctrine of estoppel by deed. The doctrine of
estoppel by deed has been referenced by that name in only three Utah cases: Hall v.
Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983), Dowse v. Kammerman, 246 P.2d 881 (Utah 1952),
and Allen v. Fitzgerald, 65 P. 592 (Utah 1901). From these references, it would appear that

the doctrine of estoppel by deed is recognized as the law of Utah. It is certainly recognized
in other jurisdictions.
The doctrine of estoppel by deed . . . is of such universal recognition that
citation of precedents would serve no useful purpose
"In this country a
party is estopped not only from denying his deed, but every fact which it
recites
" Such recitals constitute primary proof which cannot be averred
against.
Woldert v. Skelly Oil Co., 202 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (citations omitted).
However, there is some question as to whether this doctrine applies to easements or
other servitudes. For instance, Dowse states:
There is no diversity of opinion to the rule that estoppel by deed operates only
where the conveyance is intended to convey a particular estate, which the
grantor subsequently acquires.
246 P.2d at 882 (emphasis added). Similar language can be drawn from other jurisdictions.
See Callahan v. Stewart, 231 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Okla. 1964) (estoppel works upon the
specific estate). California, on the other hand, has held the doctrine applicable to easements.
See Noronha v. Stewart, 245 Cal. Rptr. 94 (Ct. App. 1988) (after-acquired title statute does
not apply to easements but estoppel by deed does) (full text, Add. Ex. 3).
If, like the After-Acquired Title Statute, the doctrine of estoppel by deed is applicable
only to estates in land and not to servitudes, then Loves could not have acquired an
easement over the Arnold property under this theory. Alternatively, if the Court holds that
the doctrine is applicable to easements, Loves' claim of easement is still barred for other
reasons addressed below. However, before addressing those reasons, the Court should
clarify that estoppel by deed is purely an equitable doctrine, not one arising from the
common law.

III.

THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL BY DEED OPERATES IN EQUITY, NOT
AT LAW, AND THUS, AN EASEMENT WAS NOT "AUTOMATICALLY"
CREATED IN FAVOR OF THE LOVES WHEN WESTERN MANAGEMENT
TOOK TITLE TO THE ARNOLD PROPERTY.
Loves argued, R.373-74, 375, and the trial court found, R.991-95, that an easement

was created "automatically" under the common law doctrine of estoppel by deed when
Western Management came into title to the Arnold property in 1982. "N"; R.301. However,
the Utah cases applying the doctrine estoppel by deed, as well as other authorities, make
clear the equitable origins of estoppel by deed. For example, the Wyoming Supreme Court,
noting the fact that "the rule of estoppel is fundamentally one of equity," has declared:
it is still an equitable doctrine, not an inflexible rule, a shield of the innocent,
not a sword of destruction.
Sharpies Corp. v. Sinclair Wyo. Oil Co., 168 P.2d 565, 569 (Wyo. 1946) (citations omitted).
The court also stated:
The ultimate criterion herein would seem to be the intention of the parties,
which must be gathered . . . from the deed itself and the surrounding
circumstances.
Id., at 568.
An early treatise on this subject probes its origins and dispels the mistaken
assumption that the doctrine is derived from the common law:
[I]n the majority of the cases decided, the courts, in endeavoring to administer
substantial justice, have unconsciously been administering the doctrines of
equity, although professedly basing the result upon certain supposed rules of
the common law which really have no existence

William Henry Rawle, A Practical Treatise in the Law of Covenants for Title § 265,
at 424 n.l (5th ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1887). A passage by Rawle is worth
quoting verbatim:
It may well be doubted whether the elaborate learning [of the American
Courts] by which the [American] doctrine [of estoppel by deed] is sought to
be deduced from and connected with the [early English common] law of
warranty or the modern covenants for title, under the branch of estoppel, has
any application whatever to such law. Practically it has not, for it has been
seen that the doctrine is applied not only where all remedies growing out of
warranty or of covenant are wanting, but where, in the absence of covenants,
it is made to depend upon intention, indicated by recital or otherwise. No
one can fail to perceive that with few exceptions the [American] cases which
have taken up this doctrine were correctly decided upon the facts presented,
and objection should lie rather to the grounds of the decisions, which are
sought to be based upon common law instead of upon equitable doctrine. For
the result of the cases would seem to show that instead of giving effect to a
rule of the common law, they are in fact administering equity
Id. at 422-23 ("intention" emphasized in original).
Because estoppel by deed operates in equity, Loves' claim that Lowenberg
"automatically" became owner of an easement over the Arnold property at the instant
Western Management came into title to that property is incorrect. Similarly, the trial court
improperly followed the Loves' analysis, when it held:
[the] after-acquired title doctrine or estoppel by deed apply in this case
because both Western Management and the individual partners came into title
to the Arnold Property.
R.994. There is no basis or means by which the easement could have "automatically"
passed, as Loves argued and the trial court held. Rather, the doctrine is equitable in nature
and operates as:

a bar which precludes a party to a deed and his privies from asserting as
against the other and his privies, any right or title in derogation of the deed, or
from denying the truth of any material fact asserted in [the deed].
31 CJ.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 10 (1996) (full text, Add. Ex. 3); see also Kadrmas v.
Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971) (similar language). The distinction is between an
estoppel analysis, which operates in equity against a common grantor, and a conveyancing
analysis, under which an easement would vest automatically as a matter of law.
In support of the view that the doctrine operates in equity and therefore a court must
examine the equities, the Wyoming Supreme Court stated:
Not every conveyance involves an estoppel; a sound reason must exist to
result in an estoppel as to after-acquired property
After all the rule of
estoppel is fundamentally one of equity. Thus it was said in Midland Realty
Co. of Minnesota v. Halverson that "the doctrine of estoppel was invented and
engrafted upon the law to prevent wrongs and not to promote them."
Sharpies Corp. v. Sinclair Wyo. Oil Co., 168 P.2d 565, 569 (Wyo. 1946) (citation omitted).
The doctrine of estoppel by deed does not operate automatically to vest an easement in
Loves. Furthermore, as demonstrated below, the equities do not favor an application of the
doctrine for the benefit of the Loves.

IV. LOVES CANNOT DEMONSTRATE REASONABLE RELIANCE AND THUS
ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF ESTOPPEL BY DEED.
As in other instances of estoppel, reasonable reliance is a necessary element of
estoppel by deed. Am. Sec. Transfer Inc. v. Pantheon Indus., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 400 (D.
Colo. 1994) (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Trailer and Truck Repair, Co., 828 F.2d 205 (3d Cir.
1987)); see also Dominex, Inc. v. Key, 456 So. 2d 1047 (Ala. 1984), Duke v. Hopper, 486
S.W.2d 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972). In this case, any reliance by Loves, or their predecessor,

upon the representations in the 1982 Warranty Deed ("D") was clearly not reasonable. This
is because all of the defects in the purported grant of the easement (pp. 7-8, 13 above) were
a matter of public record in 1982, as well as in 1995, when Loves acquired their property.
Loves and their predecessor are charged with notice of those defects. See Hayes v. Gibbs,
169 P.2d 781 (Utah 1946) (where purchaser had notice of impediments appearing in the
chain of title, he is chargeable with knowledge).
It is well-settled in Utah law that one who claims the benefit of an estoppel cannot
rely upon representations or acts "if he had the means by which with reasonable diligence he
could ascertain the truth." Perkins v. Great-West Life Assur. Co., 814 P.2d 1125, 1130
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (full text, Add. Ex. 3). The public record is a means by which such
knowledge may be obtained. In Gilbertson v. Charlson, the North Dakota Supreme Court
stated that one requirement for estoppel was that:
the party seeking estoppel not only lack actual knowledge regarding the true
state of title, but be destitute of means of acquiring such knowledge. A public
record is such a means.
301 N.W.2d 144, 148 (N.D. 1981) (citations omitted). Similarly, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has held that a search of the public record puts a prudent purchaser on inquiry notice
of visible flaws in title and thus actual notice is chargeable to that purchaser, who cannot
then claim estoppel. Vaughn v. Dossett, 243 S.W.2d 565 (Ark. 1951); see also Schmidt v.
Olympia Light & Power Co., 90 P. 212 (Wash. 1907) ("A party cannot rely on so much of a
public record as is favorable to his contention, and close his eyes to the remainder.").
The requirement of reasonable reliance applies equally to estoppel by deed as it does
in cases of equitable estoppel. Am. Sec. Transfer Inc. v. Pantheon Indus., Inc., 871 F. Supp.

400 (D. Colo. 1994) (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Trailer and Truck Repair, Co., 828 F.2d 205 (3d
Cir. 1987)). Accordingly, the Loves cannot demonstrate reasonable reliance because the
public record gave notice of all defects.
In considering the equities of this case, it is worth pointing out that while the Loves
were on notice of all the defects in their chain of title, Arnold had no notice of Loves' claim,
as demonstrated above (pp. 7-8, 13) and below (Point XI).

V.

THE DOCTRINE OF COUNTER ESTOPPEL BARS THE LOVES' CLAIM
OF ESTOPPEL BY DEED.
Even if Lowenberg's or Loves' reliance had been reasonable, which it was not, the

doctrine of estoppel by deed could not vest Loves with an easement because of a counter
estoppel which arose from a special warranty deed executed by Western Management in
1984. Through this deed ("O"; R.302), Western Management warranted to Arnold's
predecessor against all encumbrances created "by, through, or under" Western Management.
Central to the issue of counter estoppel, Loves' claim of easement arises "by, through, and
under" Western Management, the common grantor. R.277, 372, 598.
Utah Code Annotated section 57-1-12 states that, by its warranty, Western
Management warranted and covenanted to its successors in title that no easement existed
across the Arnold property. Section 57-1-12 provides that any exception to such a covenant
"may be briefly inserted in such deed following the description of the land." The 1984
special warranty deed from Western Management has no exception of any sort. "O"; R.302.

By warranting to Loves' predecessor-in-title that an easement existed, and then
subsequently warranting to Arnold's predecessor-in-title that no easement existed, Western
Management, the common grantor, has created a counter estoppel.
[I]f both parties claim under the same person and one is estopped by one deed
and the other is estopped by another deed, both made by that person, one
estoppel offsets the other, and the rights of the parties are to be adjusted
without regard to any estoppel.
31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 10 (1996) (full text, Add. Ex. 3); see also Schmidt v.
Olympia Light & Power Co., 90 P. 212 (Wash. 1907) (similar language). In Florida Land
Inv. Co. v. Williams, 116 So. 642 (Fla. 1928), the Florida Supreme Court held,
[t]he rule is . . . well settled that, if the defendant offers an estoppel [in] his
defense, the plaintiff may assert a counter estoppel, and proof of the counter
estoppel sets the matter at large; that is to say, one estoppel neutralizes the
other, leaving the matter as if neither estoppel had been offered.
See also Linville v. Nance Dev. Co., 304 P.2d 453,459 (Kan. 1956); Hopkins v. Hopkins,
165 So. 414 (Miss. 1936).
While no Utah case discusses counter estoppel by that name, it is a wholesome
doctrine, well-recognized in the law. See 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 132 (2000)
(and footnote cases). The doctrine is regularly considered by courts in a wide range of legal
applications. For example: it has been applied in the context of UCC cases on negotiable
instruments, First Nat'l Bank of Conway v. Henry, No. CA 87-320, 1988 WL 30189 (Ark.
Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988), Parsons Travel, Inc. v. Hoag, 570 P.2d 445 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977);
it has been applied to insurance contract claims, Farley v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 513
N.Y.S.2d 712 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (court applied counter estoppel to return the parties to
"status quo ante," balancing equities), Emmco Ins. Co. v. Palatine Ins. Co., 58 N.W.2d 525

(Wis. 1953) (Gehl, J., dissenting); it has also been referenced in bankruptcy, Joe Morgan,
Inc. v. Amsouth Bank N.A., 985 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1993). Generally, the doctrine is
applied—in principle, if not in name—to cases where a party asserting estoppel should be
estopped from making such a claim due to operative facts or events being within their
knowledge or control. See Henderson v. First Nat'l Bank of Dewitt, 494 S.W.2d 452 (Ark.
1973), Clark v. Lesher, 290 P.2d 293 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) ("Where an estoppel exists
against an estoppel, the matter is set at large . . . as if neither estoppel had been
offered . . . .").
Under the doctrine of counter estoppel, the rights of Loves and Arnold are to be
adjusted without regard to Loves' claim of estoppel by deed or Arnold's counter estoppel.
This leaves only the deeds, to be examined under the principles of conveyancing law. When
so examined, it is clear that the 1982 Warranty Deed failed to create an easement. As will
be demonstrated directly, the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed is similarly ineffective to
create an easement in favor of Loves.
VI.

THE 1991 CORRECTIVE WARRANTY DEED IS VOID FOR WANT OF A
GRANTOR BECAUSE UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT, A PARTNERSHIP OWNS ITS REAL PROPERTY, THE INDIVIDUAL
PARTNERS DO NOT.
The Corrective Warranty Deed ("E"; R.277), is flawed for several reasons. The most

immediate flaw is that, as to the Arnold property, the deed is void for want of a grantor.
This is because the deed was executed by Western Management, a partnership, at a time
when four individuals held record title to the property. The trial court hurdled this issue by
stating, "Title to the Arnold property was vested in the partners of Western

Management

" R.994. In so holding, the trial court necessarily accepted Loves'

"aggregate theory" of partnerships. Under this theory, a partnership is an aggregate of its
partners and—for purposes of owning and controlling partnership property—there is no
distinction between partnership and individual property. By contrast, under the entity
theory, partnership property is owned by the partnership, not the partners. In accepting the
aggregate theory of partnerships, the trial court assumed a position directly contrary to that
of the Uniform Partnership Act as it has been interpreted by courts nation wide.
A.

Under The Entity Theory Of Partnerships, Partnership Property Belongs
To The Firm, Not The Partners; Therefore, The 1991 Corrective
Warranty Deed Is Void For Want Of A Grantor.

The Uniform Partnership Act (Utah Code Ann., Title 48) (hereinafter "the Act") (full
text, Add. Ex. 4) has been adopted by Utah and a majority of the states which have
recognized that partnership property is distinctfromproperty owned by the partners in their
individual capacities. A leading commentator addressing this issue has noted:
Functionally, despite the literal language [of the partnership act], the
partnership owns its property and the partners do not. The Act would be
better if it conceded this rather than accomplishing it by indirection.
Alan R. Bromberg, Crane and Bromberg on Partnership § 40(b), at 230 (1968). A
California appellate court addressed this same issue. Noting the foregoing authority, that
court concluded,
a partnership [is] a "hybrid" organization that is viewed as an aggregation of
individuals for some purposes, and as an entity for others. One of the primary
areas in which a partnership is viewed as an entity is with respect to
ownership of property.

Bartlome v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added) (full text, Add. Ex. 3).
Support for this position is found throughout the Act itself. For instance, the Act
creates a new tenancy, the "tenancy in partnership." Through this new tenancy, a partner's
interest in specific real property is converted to personalty. In re Ostler's Estate, 286 P.2d
796, 799 (Utah 1955) (full text, Add. Ex. 3). In contrast to a tenancy in partnership, persons
outside a partnership take title to real property as either tenants in common or as joint
tenants. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-5 (Supp. 2000). These are conveyances of real property in
fee simple, not personalty. Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-1(3), -3 (1994). This conversion to
personalty is further indication that a partnership owns its property and the partners do not.
Additionally, Utah Code Annotated section 48-1-22 sets forth an individual partner's
interest in partnership property. It begins by stating: "A partner is [a] co-owner with his
partners of specific partnership property holding as a tenant in partnership." The statute
then continues, defining "tenancy in partnership" in such a narrow and restrictive fashion
that any individual partner cannot be viewed as an "owner" of partnership property in any
traditional sense. That section states that a partner has no right to possess partnership
property for non-partnership purposes without the consent of fellow partners; it prohibits a
partner from assigning or selling his interest in specific partnership property without the
consent of the partners; it prohibits execution or attachment of specific partnership property
in connection with the debt of an individual partner; and it requires that the right to specific
partnership property vests in surviving partners rather than the estate of a deceased partner.
The statutory removal of these incidents of ownership dictates that individual partners

simply do not own property held in the name of the partnership. Conversely, and relevant to
the execution of the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed by Western Management, neither does
a partnership own the separate property of its members.
A leading commentator has interpreted the Act as follows:
[T]he partnership, rather than the partners, owns the firm property, as is
apparent from the Act's recognition that all property brought into the
partnership, and property acquired with partnership funds, is partnership
property
[P]rior law long held that the joint effects of a partnership belong
to the firm, not to the partners, and that a partner has no individual property in
any specific assets of the firm.
59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership § 384 (1987) (full text, Add. Ex. 3).
Under the Act, with regard to ownership and conveyancing of property, a general
partnership is an entity much like a corporation, a limited liability company, or a limited
partnership. As with any of these entities, an instrument executed by an officer/agent in
his/her representative capacity would not bind the individual. Because Western
Management was an entity separatefromthe individual partners, and because the 1991
Corrective Warranty Deed was executed by the partnership, it was not effective to encumber
the Arnold property which was owned by the individuals. Stated otherwise, as to the Arnold
property, the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed is void for want of a grantor. Compare Sharp
v. Riekhof, 747 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1987) (deed to a "trust," which is a non-existing entity, is
void for want of a grantee) (full text, Add. Ex. 3), Nilson v. Hamilton, 174 P. 624 (Utah
1918) (deed to a deceased person or his estate is void because neither is a legal entity).

B.

For Purposes Of Owning And Conveying Property, The Entity Theory Of
Partnerships Is The Majority Position.
The rule that a partnership is an entity is supported by long-standing cases, in Utah

and elsewhere. For example, in the 1955 Utah Supreme Court case, In re Ostler's Estate, a
widow sought to classify certain property held by her deceased husband's partnership as the
decedent's personal property, thus making it available for distribution as part of his estate.
In its analysis of the nature of partnership property, this Court considered common law
precedent and the Uniform Partnership Act, as interpreted in other states. The Court
concluded that the Act was intended to enforce the English rule, which held that
where land . . . has become partnership property, it shall... be treated as
between the partners (including the representative of a deceased partner), and
also as between the heirs of a deceased partner and his executors or
administrators as personal or movable, and not real or heritable, estate.
In re Ostler's Estate, 286 P.2d at 798 (Utah 1955) (quoting Partnership Act of 1890, 53 and
54 Vict. Chapt. 39) (full text, Add. Ex. 3). Thus, consistent with an entity theory of
partnerships, the Court in Ostler's Estate adopted what is recognized as the majority view
that an individual's usual ownership interest in real property is converted from real property
to personalty when it becomes partnership property. See Ostler's Estate, 286 P.2d at 799.
In its decision, this Court used reasoning similar to that of a California appellate court in
Fong Sing v. O'Dell, 194 P. 745 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920), an early California case that
involved distribution considerations similar to Ostler's Estate. In that case, the California
court stated,
the governing principle as to the relation of the partners to the partnership
property is stated as follows:.. .firm property is not owned by the partners
in severaltyj but belongs to the partnership

Id. at 746-47 (emphasis added).
Numerous decisions from other courts and jurisdictions demonstrate the formation of
a majority position as to the Uniform Partnership Act1 and the specific issue of property
ownership. In Roberts v. Roberts, 198 P.2d 453 (Colo. 1948), the Colorado Supreme Court
considered a partner's interest in partnership property after dissolution of the partnership
and stated that "personal property of a partnership is owned not by the partners individually,
but by the partnership." Id. at 454. In Salomon Bros. & Hutzler v. Pedrick, 105 F. Supp.
210 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), the federal district court held that a partner cannot be regarded as the
owner of an undivided interest in partnership property. Noting section 25 of the Uniform
Partnership Act, the court stated that:
It seems clear to this court that the rights of each individual partner in specific
partnership assets, referred to in the statute as "tenant in partnership" falls
short of what would ordinarily be regarded as individual ownership even of an
undivided interest in specific assets.
Id. at 213-14. An early ruling from the Nevada Supreme Court also states the long-standing
majority position as to ownership of partnership property, holding:
It is well settled that the property of a partnership belongs to the firm and not
to the partners. A partner has no individual property in any specific assets of
the firm. Instead, the interest of each partner in the partnership property is his
share in the surplus, after the partnership debts are paid and the partnership
accounts have been settled.
State v. Elsbury, 175 P.2d 430,433 (Nev. 1946) (citations omitted).

1

For example, in 1994, the Texas legislature explicitly accepted the entity theory of
partnerships and rejected the aggregate theory. 48 Baylor L. Rev. 1213, 1216.

In a decision from the Fifth Circuit, the federal court was required to determine the
ownership of partnership property for purposes of conflicting insurance claims. Employers
Cas. Co. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co., 632 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1980). The
Employers case arose under the law of the State of Alabama, which has adopted the
Uniform Partnership Act in a form essentially identical to the act adopted in Utah. The
federal court reasoned that the Act "destroy [ed] the traditional incidents of ownership" of an
individual partner and concluded,
[t]he weight of authority is that individual partners do not own partnership
property. It is apparent that a partner's real interest in the partnership is not
ownership of specific property but rather is his share of the profits and surplus.
Employers, 632 F.2d at 1220 (citing Salomon Bros. & Hutzler v. Pedrick, 105 F. Supp. 210
(S.D.N.Y. 1952); Wolfe v. Hewes, 254 S.E.2d 204 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Gaines v. Gaines,
519 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 85; 60 Am. Jur. 2d
Partnerships § 102).
Under long-settled principles of partnership law, it is clear that a partnership is an
entity, separate and distinct from the partners. Such a conclusion is consistent with other
decisions from Utah courts: Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehab., Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee &
Sports Med., 909 P.2d 266 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (like partnerships, joint ventures are
distinct and separate legal entities) (full text, Add. Ex. 3), Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767
P.2d 499 (Utah 1988) (noting several sections of the Uniform Partnership Act treating
partnership as a separate legal entity) (full text, Add. Ex. 3), Wall Inv. Co. v. Garden Gate
Distrib., Inc., 593 P.2d 542 (Utah 1979) (limited partnership is a distinct legal entity which
can bring suit in its own name) (full text, Add. Ex. 3), Hamner v. B.K. Bloch & Co., 52 P.

770 (Utah 1898) (a judgment entered against a partnership is void as to the assets of a
partner) (full text, Add. Ex. 3).
In summary, the execution of the Corrective Warranty Deed by Western
Management, an entity separate and distinct from its individual partners, cannot create an
easement over property owned by the individuals.
VIL THE CORRECTIVE WARRANTY DEED IS VOID FOR WANT OF A GRANTOR
UNDER SETTLED PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY LAW.
Under the Act, it is also important to note that agency law governs the acts of the
partners on behalf of a partnership. It is well-settled agency law that the acts of an agent on
behalf of a disclosed principal are the acts of the principal, not the agent. See Utah Code
Ann. § 48-1-6 (1998) (full text, Add. Ex. 4); Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 1996) (as a
contractual provision, implied warranty of habitability may not be enforced against agent
who lawfully entered into lease on behalf of disclosed principal); 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency §
302 (1986) ("If a contract is made with a known agent acting within the scope of his
authority for a disclosed principal, the contract is that of the principal alone and the agent
cannot be held liable thereon

")•

In this case, four partners signed the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed as agents of
Western Management. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-6 (1998). In so doing, they could not
encumber property that was owned in the agents' individual capacities. Consistently, the
Utah Supreme Court has held that a partner who signs his name over a designation of
authority is not personally liable on the document. Marveon Sign Co. v. Roennebeck, 694
P.2d 604 (Utah 1984). See also Wayne Smith Constr. Co. v. Wolman, 363 S.E.2d 115, 117

(S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (when a partnership enters a contract, it is with the partnership as an
entity distinct from its members, not with the individual members).
Moreover, these same four individuals understood the significance of their signing
capacity, having executed earlier deeds in the Arnold chain of title wherein they
distinguished between acts in their individual and representative capacities. In a 1981
quitclaim deed ("L"), Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minson, Robert S. Halander, and H. Fred
Smith each signed "individually" as well as "general partner" of Western Management.
Later, in 1982, these individuals each signed a quitclaim deed ("N"), but this time,
"individually" and not as partners. Thus, these individuals were not naive, but rather were
sophisticated executors when they signed the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. There is no
ambiguity as to the capacity in which they executed the Corrective Warranty Deed.
Well-accepted principles of agency law dictate that the Corrective Warranty Deed
was executed by the agents of an entity without an ownership interest, and thus, is void for
want of a grantor.
VIII. THIRD PARTIES ARE ENTITLED TO RELY UPON RECORD TITLE,
THUS ARNOLD TOOK WITHOUT NOTICE OF THE 1991 CORRECTIVE
WARRANTY DEED.
A.

While The Intention Of The Partners As To Ownership May Be
Controlling As Among Partners, Third Parties Are Entitled To Rely
Upon The Record Title.

The general presumption is that ownership of real estate is where the muniments of
title place it. In re Perry's Estate, 192 P.2d 532, 536 (Mont. 1948); Picetti v. Orcio, 58 P.2d
1046, 1047 (Nev. 1936), affd 67 P.2d 315. This is particularly applicable where record title
demonstrates that the signatories recognized the distinction between signing in an individual

and in a representative capacity. The holding in In re Granada, Inc., 92 B.R. 501 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1988) (full text, Add. Ex. 3), a case which has striking parallels with the 1991
Corrective Warranty Deed in the present case, demonstrates how innocent third parties are
entitled to rely on the record title.
In Granada, real property had been purchased by and was held in the name of
Granada, Inc. prior to the organization of a limited partnership. Granada ultimately became
the general partner of the limited partnership, Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd. On the date of
Granada's bankruptcy petition, record title showed Granada as the fee owner. Just like
Western Management in this case, Cinnamon Ridge Ltd. had no record interest. The trustee
in bankruptcy filed an action to quiet title to the property and to avoid the interest of the
partnership. Noting that section 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code empowers a trustee with
the rights of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser of real property, the court applied Utah law
and allowed the trustee to take the real property free and clear of the unrecorded interest of
the partnership. In its discussion of constructive notice, the court stated:
Record title was indisputably in the name of Granada in its own capacity.
Title could have been held in the name of "Granada, General Partner" or "
Granada, General Partner of the Cinnamon Ridge Limited Partnership" or "
Granada, in trust for the Cinnamon Ridge Limited Partnership." However,
that was not done. Title, as it was held in this case, imparted no constructive
notice of the Partnership's interest.
92 B.R. at 504 (emphasis added). This analysis is applicable here. In this case, record title
indicates that in 1991 the Arnold property was owned by H. Fred Smith, Robert S.
Halander, Dale N. Minson, and Ronald Smith. "R" and "S". If Western Management had an
interest in the Arnold property, record title could have easily so indicated as set forth by the

Granada court. However, as in Granada, this was not done. Accordingly, as it was held,
record title imparted no constructive notice of any interest Western Management may have
had in the Arnold property.
Further, the record shows that in 1987 the property was transferred from a
partnership consisting largely of the same individuals (Smith, Halander, Smith and
Associates) into the names of the four individuals. "R"; R.309. This fact begs the question:
If the property was intended to be owned by Western Management, why did these persons
as partners execute a deed to themselves individually? As noted by the South Dakota
Supreme Court, "Such conduct would, of course, be illogical and unnecessary if the
partnership owned the land." Reiners v. Sherard, 233 N.W.2d 579, 582 (S.D. 1975).
Because record title was in the individuals, Arnold took without notice of any interest of
Western Management.
B.

Loves Are Bound By The Record Title.

An underlying consideration that arose within the estoppel issues, but which impacts
other issues in this appeal, is the relative effect the public record should have upon the
parties' positions. As noted above and below (VIII, X, and XI), Arnold was not on notice of
the Corrective Warranty Deed. Arnold only discovered the Corrective Warranty Deed from
inquiries beyond the public record. R. 1074-76,1077,1190. Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-6(1)(12) (1998) (full text, Add. Ex. 4). And, as Justice Howe has noted, "[T]here is not
'constructive notice' when an inquiry extrinsic to the public record is necessary." County
Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County v. State Tax Comm'n of Utah, 789 P.2d 291,296
(Utah 1990) (Howe, J., dissenting).

In contrast to the absence of notice to Arnold, the official record clearly showed the
flaws in Loves' claim of easement. This includes the defects in: the 1975 deed from PlanTech to Minson-Halander ("A"), the 1979 deeds from Minson-Halander to Western
Management ("B" and "C"), the 1982 Warranty Deed from Western Management to
Lowenberg ("D"), and the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. "E". This record therefore
binds the Loves.
A party cannot rely on so much of a public record as is favorable to his
contention, and close his eyes to the remainder.
Schmidt v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 90 P. 212, 216 (Wash. 1907); see also Hayes v.
Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781 (Utah 1946) (where purchaser had notice of impediments appearing in
the chain of title, he is chargeable with knowledge); Burlington N., Inc. v. L.P. Hall, 322
N.W.2d 233 (N.D. 1982) (a person on inquiry notice who does not make inquiry is deemed
to have constructive notice and is not a purchaser in good faith).
In comparing the effect of record title upon the relative positions of the parties, it is
apparent that Loves had the opportunity to discover the defects in their purported grant of
easement and are therefore bound by the record, while Arnold took without notice of any
such claim.
IX.

THE 1991 CORRECTIVE WARRANTY DEED DID NOT CREATE AN
EASEMENT FOR THREE FURTHER REASONS.
The Corrective Warranty Deed failed to establish an easement in 1991 because: 1)

the deed lacks the necessary statutory language to effectuate a conveyance in 1991,2) a
confirmation deed cannot correct a void deed, and similarly, 3) a confirmation deed cannot
affect property which is owned by third parties.

First, in order to have a conveyance under Utah Code Annotated section 57-1-12 or
section 57-1-13, a deed must state that an interest is conveyed and warranted (section 57-112) or that an interest is quitclaimed (section 57-1-13). The Corrective Warranty Deed does
not so state. Rather, the operative language is as follows:
THEREFORE, to correct such mistakes, the parties to this Deed hereby
amend the legal description on the [1982] Warranty Deed to the legal
descriptions set forth on Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
"E"; R.278-79 (emphasis added). The exhibit then sets forth this language:
The Grantee is granted the right over the existing access ways for convenient
ingress and egress to Grantee's adjoining property as the same exists or as the
same may subsequently be modified, provided, however, access will always
be convenient and Grantor or its successors and assigns shall not prevent
Grantee or his successors and assigns from convenient access to the adjoining
property described above.
"E"; R.282. Notwithstanding the use of the word "granted" in the exhibit, it is clear from
the sixth recital in the deed that the parties did not intend to create a new grant. This recital
states:
WHEREAS, the parties hereto intend that the corrections shall relate back to
the date of the prior conveyance by the [1982] "Warranty Deed", so that the
estate of William J. Lowenberg, grantee, will be as intended by the parties.
The parties do not intend and do not hereby create any new limitation
periods on actions or extend the same by virtue of this Deed.
"E"; R.278 (emphasis added). This unambiguous language in the deed makes clear that the
parties did not intend to create a new easement in 1991.
Second, correction or confirmation deeds are only effective if the original
conveyance is not void.
[T]he purpose of a correction deed is to admit mutual error and change
the original instrument to conform to the true intent of the parties. On

the other hand, a deed which does not of itself purport to convey the
land will not operate to confirm the estate of a grantee who has no
estate or whose deed is void.
23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 15 (1983) (emphasis added); 26A C.J.S. Deeds, § 42 (20001)
(conveyance must contain operative language) (full text, Add. Ex. 3). This is of course the
precise circumstance presented by the facts of this case. The Corrective Warranty Deed
does not itself purport to convey an easement; it merely seeks to amend a legal description
in the 1982 Warranty Deed. In addition, as to the conveyance of an easement, the 1982
Warranty Deed was void for want of a grantor. This is because Plan-Tech Corp. did not
convey an easement to Minson-Halander ("A"). Therefore, Minson-Halander had no
easement to convey to Western Management ("B" and "C"). Likewise, Western
Management had no easement to convey to Lowenberg in 1982.
Finally, corrective or confirmation deeds have no application where the grantor has
conveyed the property and the rights of third parties have intervened.
[T]here can be no valid correction or confirmation of a void deed, and this is
especially true when rights in the land have accrued to third parties prior to
execution of the confirming deed.
23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 333 (1983) (citing Blevins v. Mfrs. Record Publ'g Co., 105 So. 2d
392 (La. 1957). Likewise,
Except where the grantor has divested himself or herself of title, a deed
may be corrected by a subsequent instrument in the absence offraud,or
the intervention of the rights of third persons
26A CJ.S. Deeds § 43 (2001) (full text, Add. Ex. 3). See also Regan v. Boston Gas Light
Co., 1884 WL 10534 (Mass.) (where the grantors previously parted with title, they cannot
impose additional servitudes by a correction deed). At the time Western Management

executed the 1991 Warranty Deed, it had already conveyed away any interest it had in the
Arnold property. This occurred seven years earlier in 1984. "O". As a result, Western
Management had no interest in the Arnold property on January 22, 1991, and the Corrective
Warranty Deed is ineffective.
X.

ARNOLD WAS NOT ON NOTICE OF LOVES' CLAIM OF EASEMENT
BECAUSE OF DEFECTS IN THE 1982 WARRANTY DEED AND ERRORS
IN THE ABSTRACTING AND INDEXING OF THE 1991 CORRECTIVE
WARRANTY DEED.
Prior discussions of constructive notice have dealt with the lack of notice imparted

from the contents of deeds in the record. Specifically, those arguments dealt with the
absence of any record easement which could be conveyed by Western Management, the
defective description in the 1982 deed, and the fact that the grantors of the Corrective
Warranty Deed had no interest of record. Those issues concern notice imparted from the
contents of the documents themselves. This section deals with two related issues: inquiry
notice and constructive notice from the statutory indices and abstracts.
A.

Loves' "Claim" Of Easement vs. An Actual Easement—Notice Inquiry.

As demonstrated above, pp. 8, 13, although the 1982 Warranty Deed was indexed and
abstracted to the Arnold property, the legal description of the purported easement did not
describe any portion of the Arnold property. For this reason, the deed did not give
constructive notice of a claim of an easement by Loves over the Arnold property. This,
however, raises an important point concerning notice inquiry.
One kind of constructive notice is notice which results from a record or which
is imputed by the recording statutes; and the other is notice which is presumed
because of the fact that a person has knowledge of certain facts which should
impart to him, or lead him to, knowledge of the ultimate fact.

First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah 1998). Even if Arnold
and its predecessors had been on notice of the easement purportedly granted in the Warranty
Deed, through either the record or through the use of the Arnold property, such notice would
have only been notice of a claim of an easement, not an easement in fact. This is because no
easement existed. Thus, if Arnold had inquired of Lowenberg in 1993 about an easement,
and if Lowenberg had stated that he owned an easement, the 1982 Warranty Deed upon
which Lowenberg would have based his asserted easement still failed as a matter of law to
create an easement for the reasons noted above.
In addition, after inquiring of Lowenberg and being advised that Lowenberg claimed
an easement, Arnold would have had no duty to look beyond the deeds of record.
Diversified Equities, Inc. v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 739 P.2d 1133, 1137 n.5 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) ("[A] duty to inquire is not a duty to disbelieve, aggressively investigate, and set
straight."). The law places no duty on Arnold to correct the flaws in Loves' claim of
easement. Indeed, such acts would be inconsistent with Arnold's interests. Further, if
Arnold had inquired and Lowenberg asserted an easement, it is clear that inquiry would
have lead the parties to exactly the same position in which they find themselves today. That
is, Loves' predecessor, Lowenberg, asserting a claim of an easement and Arnold asserting
the absence thereof.
The same is true with regard to the Corrective Warranty Deed. Even if the Court
declines to adopt the analysis immediately below and determines that the Corrective

Warranty Deed gave constructive notice, it would only have been notice of Loves' claim of
an easement based upon invalid deeds, not of an easement in fact.
B.

From Whence Does Constructive Notice Arise?

With regard to the Corrective Warranty Deed, the precise question presented herein
is: From whence does constructive notice arise? See Boyer v. Pahvant Mercantile & Inv.
Co., 287 P. 188 (Utah 1930) ("It may become necessary at some future time, and in a proper
case, for this court to decide whether a mere filing of an instrument for record with the
recording officer is sufficient to impart constructive notice.") (full text, Add. Ex. 3). Arnold
believes that, consistent with due process considerations, notice arises from the abstracts and
the indices provided for in the recorder's statute—in this case, Utah Code Annotated section
17-21-6 (2), (3), and (6) (1998) (full text, Add. Ex. 4). Utah's race-notice statute, enacted at
the time relevant to this appeal (Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2 (1994)) (full text, Add. Ex. 4),
states that notice was imparted upon "filing" of a document with the appropriate county
recorder. However, neither the race-notice statute nor the recorder's statute define either
"filing" or "recording." Boyer v. Pahvant Mercantile & Inv. Co., 287 P. at 190-91 (nothing
in section 57-3-2 or section 57-3-3 specifically defines what is meant by the word
"recorded"). The recorder's statute does, however, authorize various means of recording
such as typewriter, camera, microfilm, etc. Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-3 (1998) (full text,
Add. Ex. 4).

C.

Because The Corrective Warranty Deed Was Not "Properly Recorded,"
It Did Not Impart Constructive Notice.

Arnold's position is that notice is imparted when an instrument is properly recorded.
This position is supported by a North Dakota Supreme Court decision:
In our state, today, the tract index is the only practical index through which
instruments on record can be located. It would be a prohibitive burden to
locate instruments on record without a tract index. It would certainly be a
travesty of justice to hold that prospective purchasers are bound by the record,
if for all practical purposes the record cannot be located.
Hanson v. Zoller, 187 N.W.2d 47, 56 (N.D. 1971) (emphasis added) (full text, Add. Ex. 3).
This reasoning is particularly appropriate in this case. When Arnold completed its title
search, the search did not reveal the Corrective Warranty Deed for two reasons. First, the
posting for the Corrective Warranty Deed does not have an abstract (an abbreviation) of the
legal description of the Arnold property. The abstracts in the tract index allow a document
to be located geographically, based upon the abbreviation of the legal description of the
property to which the document pertains. Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-6(6) (1998) (the tract
index "shall be so kept as to show a true chain of title to each tract or parcel and the
encumbrances thereon

") (full text, Add. Ex. 4). Here, there is no notice because the

posting in the tract index does not have an abstract of the legal description of the Arnold
property. R.637, see XI below. In the absence of such an abstract, because the Corrective
Warranty Deed was the 5,015,202nd document to be recorded since 1888, R.1077-78, it
would be a nearly impossible task for a title searcher to discover the deed.
Second, the grantor and grantee indices show William J. Lowenberg as both grantor
and grantee. R.637, 639, 644. The grantors' and grantees' indices allow a title search

alphabetically by the name of the grantor or grantee. Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-6(2), (3)
(1998) (full text, Add. Ex. 4). But since Lowenberg never owned an interest in the Arnold
property (Exhibit 7 and deeds referenced therein), any deed to the Arnold property executed
by Lowenberg would be a "wild" deed, void for want of a grantor, and of no consequence to
a searcher of title to the Arnold property.
In the absence of an accurate abstract in the tract index and accurate grantors' and
grantees' indices, there is no "proper recording." Without a proper recording, the only
means of discovering all documents which purport to affect a property is an instrument-byinstrument examination, based upon the entry record of every document in the Recorder's
office. An examination of all 5,015,202 documents, R. 1077-79, listed sequentially in the
entry record (Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-6(1) (1998)) of the Recorder's office would be a
prohibitive burden, as referenced by the North Dakota court. Such a burden is clearly
unreasonable and inconsistent with basic notions of due process, particularly when accurate
tract, grantor, and grantee indices provide ready accessibility to the record.
D.

Arnold's Position Is Consistent With Recent Amendments To The RaceNotice And Recorder's Statutes.

In 1998, the race-notice statute was amended to provide that a document imparts
notice of its contents "from the time of recording" as opposed to from the time "of filing"
under the prior statute. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102 (1998) (full text, Add. Ex. 4). In 1999,
the recorder's statute was rewritten and reorganized. The new recorder's statute has deleted
the authorized methods of recording previously set forth in section 17-21-3 (1998) (full text,
Add. Ex. 4), and now contemplates "recording procedures." Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-3

(1999) (full text, Add. Ex. 4). Arnold believes that these amendments are consistent with
the basic concept expressed in Hanson v. Zoller as well as reported Utah cases. See U.P.C.,
Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 990 P.2d 945, 953 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) ("[Constructive notice is
imparted when documents are properly recorded.") (citing Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2(3));
Johnson v. Higley, 989 P.2d 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) ("[T]he recording statute provides that
constructive notice is imparted when documents are properly recorded.").
Consistent with the new amendments, Arnold's position is that a document is
"properly recorded" when "recording procedures," including abstracting and indexing, are
correctly completed. A document which has been so "recorded" imparts notice of its
contents.
XI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ABSTRACT OF THE
CORRECTIVE WARRANTY DEED IMPARTED NOTICE OF THE
EASEMENT.
The abstracts and indices are not documents themselves, but rather are vehicles that

allow a searcher to discover properly recorded deeds and other instruments which purport to
affect a given property. The trial court found that the Recorder's posting of incomplete
information from the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed to the abstracts and indices was
sufficient to give notice of Loves' claim of easement. R.995. The court held that this was
because, at the end of the abstract of the Loves' property description, in the posting for the
Corrective Warranty Deed, that abstract recited, "SEE DOCUMENT FOR ADDITIONAL
DESCRIPTION." R.995.
The complete language of the relevant portions of the abstract and the language
following the abstract is set forth below. A complete copy is found at R.637. It is important

to understand that the abbreviated legal description immediately above the bolded lines is
the abstract of the legal description of the Loves' property. R.284, 637. This is not an
abstract of the legal description of the Arnold property. R.315. The trial court took these
five words out of context and mistakenly concluded that they would lead a title examiner to
the Corrective Warranty Deed. In fact, when taken in context this language does just the
opposite.
* * *

SALT LAKE COUNTY ABSTRACTS
SEC 21 TWNSHP IS, RNG 1W

* **

BEG N 0°02'35" E 1083 FT & W 2556.812 FT FR CEN SEC 22, T IS, R 1W,
SLM; N 846.434 FT; SWLY ALG CURVE TO L 69.833 FT; S 58° 19'02n W
227.853 FT; S 16°02'36" E 522.935 FT; S 73° 57'24" W 82 FT; S 16°02'36" E
67 FT; S 104 FT; E 170 FT TO BEG 3.304 AC 5337-1149, 5316-554,498388,6284-1366
ALSO POSTED SEC 22 IS 1W
SEE DOCUMENT FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION
SUBJ TO TR D BK 5009 PG 1061; SUBJ TO EASE RESTR ETC
R.637, (bold added) (full text, Add. Ex. 1, item 3)
This language, "ALSO POSTED SEC 22 IS 1W—SEE DOCUMENT FOR
ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION," is not sufficient to give notice that the Corrective
Warranty Deed affects the Arnold property. Nor does it give notice that there is additional
land affected by the Corrective Warranty Deed in Section 21, in which the Arnold property
is located. It is notice that there is additional land in Section 22 that is affected by the
Corrective Warranty Deed. But, no part of the Arnold property is located in Section 22.
Add. Ex. 1, item 2; R.527. All of the Arnold property is located in Section 21. R.527.
Accordingly, neither the limited portion of the language relied upon by the court, nor the

bolded language in its entirety, was notice to Arnold of the Corrective Warranty Deed. It is
clear that this language was only intended to be notice that the Corrective Warranty Deed
also affected that portion of the Loves' property that is also located in Section 22. Further,
the posting for the Corrective Warranty Deed indicated, by tax parcel number (15-21-226006-0000), that the Corrective Warranty Deed only pertained to the Loves' property. R.526,
1074-76.
Indeed, the bolded language and the other information in the posting directs the
attention of a title examiner of the Arnold property awayfromfurther inquiry as to whether
the Corrective Warranty Deed affects the Arnold property or any other property in Section
21. This is because, at the end of the abstract of the Loves' property, it clearly implies there
is no other affected property in Section 21 and that, if the examiner is concerned with
property located in Section 22, he/she should examine the document for an additional
description.
In arguing that these five words—SEE DOCUMENT FOR ADDITIONAL
DESCRIPTION—were sufficient to give notice, the Loves relied upon Boyer v. Pahvant
Mercantile & Inv. Co., 287 P. 188 (Utah 1930) (full text, Add. Ex. 3). However, Pahvant is
readily distinguished from this case because in Pahvant, the instrument in question was not
abstracted, but
the instrument was . . . correctly noted in the grantor's, grantee's, mortgagor's,
and mortgagee's indices.
Id. at 190. Here, the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed was not correctly noted in the tract,
nor the grantees', nor the grantors' indices. William J. Lowenberg was indexed as both

grantor and grantee. Lowenberg never owned an interest in the Arnold property. Thus, any
conveyance by Lowenberg would not affect the Arnold property and would be of no
concern to an examiner of title to the Arnold property.
Accordingly, the language in question is not "sufficient" to be notice.
XII. THE QUIET TITLE DECREE IS IRRELEVANT TO THE LOVES' CLAIM
OF EASEMENT.
The court also incorrectly concluded that the 1991 Quiet Title Decree established an
easement. R.995. In interpreting court decrees, a familiar rule of construction is applied. If
the language within a judgment is clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced as it speaks.
Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 446 (Utah 1978). In addition, neither
pleadings, findings of fact, nor matters outside the record may be used to change its
meaning or to construe it. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 97 (1994). More to the point in this
case:
It is only the decretal portion of the judgment that is operative as a judgment;
the rights of the parties are adjudicated, not by the recital of facts, but solely
by the decretal portion.
IdL § 99. Here, the decree is clear. According to its own unambiguous terms, the decree
only adjudged and decreed that the buildings on the Love property did not violate any
setback requirements of the restrictive covenants of the commercial subdivision. Arnold's
position before the trial court is clearly supported by the language of the decree that, in
pertinent part, states as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that certain real
property owned by Plaintiff William J. Lowenberg with common address of
2215 West 2300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah (described in Exhibit "A" hereto)
and the buildings situated thereon and all site improvements thereon, do not

violate any side yard requirements and otherwise fully comply with the
"Redwood Park Restrictive Covenants"... and any and all adverse claims
respecting the application of the Redwood Park Restrictive Covenants to the
fully improved buildings and other site improvements upon Plaintiffs real
property are now and forever quieted and extinguished in favor of Plaintiff
and his successors.
R.630-31. The operative language adjudges and decrees that there are no set back
requirements that have been violated. The decree has nothing to do with an easement in
favor of the Loves and is therefore irrelevant to such matters. The court's conclusion is
therefore in error.
XIII. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT RELIED UPON THE
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO STRIKE THE SAME.
After the trial court granted Loves' motion for summary judgment, Arnold filed an
objection to the court's ruling. In relevant part, Arnold noted that Loves' motion, and hence the
trial court's ruling, was based completely on deeds of record. R.970. Arnold also pointed out that
Loves had not offered any affidavit or other evidence to prove their assertion that the Arnold
property was intended to be partnership property on January 22, 1991, the date of the Corrective
Warranty Deed. R.976. The court entered an order proposed by Loves' counsel over Arnold's
objection. R.991.
After the order was entered, Loves submitted the Supplemental Affidavit of Ronald W.
Smith, one of the partners of Western Management. In material part, this affidavit stated that the
Arnold property was partnership property on January 22,1991. R.1001. Arnold then submitted
discovery to determine whether tax records, corporate books, and other business records supported
the assertions in Smith's belated affidavit. R.1038-58. Mr. Smith and the other Third Party

Defendants refused to provide any meaningful information in response to the discovery. Third
Party Defendants even refused to produce documents that were admittedly available. R.1048.
The little information provided actually supported the view that the individuals, not the
partnership, owned the Arnold property on January 22, 1991. R.1372fflf6, 8. Thereafter, Arnold
moved to strike the supplemental affidavit or, in the alternative, to compel discovery. R.1275.
The court denied Arnold's motion. R.1368. The court denied a motion to reconsider. R.1389.
Noting that the supplemental affidavit was filed after the court had signed and entered the
order on the cross-motions for summary judgment, R.991, 1001, Arnold believes that it is
exceedingly improbable that the court relied upon the affidavit. This point is raised merely to
confirm that the supplemental affidavit is not part of the record below. To the extent that the trial
court may have relied upon the affidavit, it was error for the court not to strike.
XIV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SALT LAKE COUNTY'S
MOTION TO DISMISS.
The last question deals with Arnold's claim of negligence against the County. This
claim was brought in the alternative. Arnold alleged that should it be bound, and therefore
damaged, by Loves' claim of easement, it was entitled to recover those damages from the
County for the County's failure to properly abstract and index the Corrective Warranty
Deed. R.789-91.
The facts are clear that the County's negligence occurred in January or February
1991, shortly after the execution of the Corrective Warranty Deed. R.1073,1078,1191. It
is also clear that Arnold had no notice of the County's negligence two and one-half years
later when it purchased the property, R. 1073-74, or five years later, when Loves made their

first claim of easement across the Arnold property on April 12,1996. R.1073-74.
Thereafter, Arnold tendered the defense of Loves' claim of easement to its title insurer.
R.1073. Arnold's counsel completed an initial evaluation of Loves' claim on May 23, 1996.
R.1073. Loves tendered the defense of their claim of easement to their title insurer about
the same time. R.1076. Loves' insurance counsel became involved on June 19, 1996.
R. 1076-77.
Subsequently, detailed and extensive settlement negotiations ensued. R.l 199-1245.
These discussions included detailed legal analyses of the parties' respective legal positions
as well as highly specific settlement proposals involving on-site engineering, engineered
drawings, and plat maps. R. 1236-38. Further, it is important to understand that these
negotiations involved bilateral settlement discussions on each side. That is, in order for this
matter to settle, Arnold would have to reach a settlement agreement with both its insurer and
the Loves; and similarly, Loves would have to reach a settlement agreement with their
insurer and Arnold. Ultimately, such a settlement was not possible, and litigation
commenced in earnest in July 1997. R.1077. On July 2, 1997, Arnold first discovered that
the County had failed to properly abstract and index the Corrective Warranty Deed. R.1077.
Arnold's discovery came as a consequence of an examination of the RXAU record of the
Recorder's office. R.398-99, 1190. The RXAU record is not an official record authorized
by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-6(1)-(12) (1998) (full text, Add. Ex. 4). Rather, it is
"the data entry screen" through which the Recorder "entered the information from the
[Corrective Warranty Deed]." Add. Ex. 1, item 5; R.1074. Arnold gave the County notice
of its claim pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act on August 4,1997. R.948.

These matters were presented to the trial court on the County's motion to dismiss.
R.935. The court granted the County's motion, stating in pertinent part:
The Court finds plaintiffs arguments unpersuasive. On April 12, 1996
defendants claimed an easement over plaintiffs property. Upon learning of
this claim, plaintiffs counsel evaluated the claim and the corrective warranty
deed as reflected in a May 23, 1996 correspondence between counsel. The
combination of the two events, indicates to this Court that at that time plaintiff
had reasonable grounds to question the existence of an easement and either
should have, or did, investigate the matter further.
Accordingly, as a matter of law, the plaintiff has not shown that it did not
know or could not have reasonably known about the cause of action against
defendant within the statutory period.
Add. Ex. 5, item 2; R. 1312.
A.

The Court Erred In Penalizing Arnold For Settlement Efforts.

In ruling that Arnold's claim was time-barred, the trial court failed to recognize and
implement our state's policy that promotes settlement of disputes. Alvin G. Rhodes Pump
Sales v. Indus. Common of Utah, 681 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1984); Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust
Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605 (Utah 1979); Reynolds v. Merrill 460 P.2d 323 (Utah
1969). In order to give substance and meaning to this policy, the trial court should have
recognized that such detailed and extensive settlement negotiations take time and resources,
to the exclusion of other efforts. Devoting time and resources to settlement, as in this case,
necessarily deprives a party of the opportunity to do discovery or investigate matters which
are not directly related to the settlement, or which are not obvious or apparent. By failing to
recognize that Arnold's efforts in settlement excluded other efforts that might have lead to
discovery of the County's negligence, the court effectively penalized Arnold for these
endeavors.

B.

Arnold Had No Reason To Suspect The County's Negligence.

The trial court's error is further clarified by the fact that not only did Arnold have no
notice of the County's negligence, but neither did it have reason to suspect negligence on
the part of the County. The County had an affirmative duty to disclose the existence of the
Corrective Warranty Deed. Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-1, et seq. The County's negligent
performance of this duty had two distinct consequences. First, it concealed the existence of
the Corrective Warranty Deed until 1996, when Loves first made their claim. Second, this
negligent omission, by its very nature, was itself hidden. In reasonably relying upon the
accuracy of the County's official records, which title examiners presume to be accurate,
R.1192, Arnold had no reason to suspect the County's negligence. Arnold only discovered
the negligence upon inspection of the unofficial RXAU record. Add. Ex. 1, item 5; R.39699, 1074-76, 1190 Ifll 3-5; Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-6(1)-(12) (1998) (full text, Add. Ex. 4).
Hence, Arnold argued that the statute of limitations must be tolled until July 2, 1997, under
the discovery rule. "Under the discovery rule, 'the [statute of] limitations . . . does not begin
to run until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action.'" O'Neal v. Div.
of Family Serv., 821 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Utah 1991) (quoting Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d
84, 86 (Utah 1981)).
C.

Arnold Gave Notice To The County Within One Year Of When It Should
Have Discovered The County's Negligence.

In the alternative, Arnold argued that the limitations period on its claim against the
County did not begin to run until some reasonable time after the Loves first asserted the
easement on April 12, 1996. "[T]he . . . limitations period 'does not commence to run until

the injured person knew or should have known that he had sustained an injury and that the
injury was caused by negligent action.'" Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah
1996) (quoting Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979)). In this case, the time
necessary to discover the County's negligence included sufficient time for Arnold to
negotiate settlement, search the Arnold and Loves' chains of title, and to expose an omission
which, due to the very nature of omissions, was not present on the public record.
Taken in combination, Utah Code Annotated section 63-30-13 and the discovery rule
provide that a notice of claim must be made within one year of when the facts giving rise to
the claim should have been discovered. Arnold gave notice of its claim on August 4, 1997.
Arnold's claim would be time barred only if Arnold should have discovered Xht County's
negligence more than one year earlier, or before August 4, 1996. Therefore, the trial court
placed Arnold under a duty to discover the County's negligence before August 4, 1996.
There are only 114 days between the date Loves made their claim of easement on April 12,
1996, and August 4, 1996. By granting the motion to dismiss, the trial court effectively
ruled that it was unreasonable for Arnold to take 114 days to: 1) receive the Loves' claim of
easement, 2) present the defense of the claim to its insurer, 3) investigate and evaluate the
Loves' claim, 4) become aware of the fact that the Arnold property was not described in the
abstract of the Corrective Warranty Deed, 5) conduct a detailed examination of the County's
computer files, thus discovering that the County had failed to correctly abstract the
Corrective Warranty Deed—all the while engaging in legitimate settlement efforts to
resolve the original claim by the Loves.

D.

Case Law Supports Arnold's Position.

This case is much like Klinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990) (full text, Add.
Ex. 3), and Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 902 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995) (full text,
Add. Ex. 3), because the County's mistake was concealed, technical, and esoteric and
because Arnold had no reason to doubt the accuracy of the County's records. In Sevy, the
Court noted that because "surveying requires technical knowledge and yields intangible
results, the buyers had 'no reason to suspect that the survey was inaccurate.'" Id. at 636
(quoting Klinger, 791 P.2d at 872). Like the surveying in Klinger, and the perfecting of a
security interest in water stock in Sevy, the abstracting of the 1991 Corrective Warranty
Deed by the County "require[d] technical knowledge not possessed by people in general,
and the nature of this task is such that a negligent failure to perform it properly may not be
discovered until years later." Sevy, 902 P.2d at 636 (emphasis added). In Foil v. Ballinger,
601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), this Court adopted the following reasoning of the Oregon
Supreme Court:
To say that a cause of action accrues to a person when she may maintain an
action thereon and, at the same time, that it accrues before she has or can
reasonably be expected to have knowledge of any wrong inflicted upon her is
patently inconsistent and unrealistic. She cannot maintain an action before she
knows she has one. To say to one who has been wronged, "You had a
remedy, but before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law stripped you
of your remedy," makes a mockery of the law.
601 P.2d at 148-49 (quoting Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996,998 (Or. 1966)).
Consistently, the facts of this case present an appropriate circumstance to apply the
discovery rule.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the undisputed facts and the proper application of law to those facts,
Arnold requests that this Court reverse the trial court, and direct that summary judgment be
entered in favor of Arnold, adjudging and decreeing that no easement exists across the
Arnold property. Such a ruling would of course moot Arnold's claims against the County.
In the alternative, should the Court find that Loves' claim of easement is binding upon
Arnold, Arnold requests the trial court's order on the motion to dismiss be reversed so as to
allow further proceedings against the County.
Respectfully submitted on this<^3 day of June, 2001.
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